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TAGS: [NATO](#) [PREL](#) [MOPS](#) [MARR](#) [AF](#)
SUBJECT: NATO-AFGHANISTAN: PRESSING ALLIES ON ISAF FORCE
GENERATION

REF: USNATO 572 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Ambassador Victoria Nuland, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (C) SUMMARY. Given the disappointing results during NATO's November 6-8 Global Force Generation Conference (GFGC), Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) joins me in asking Washington to turn up the political heat on those Allies whom we believe could do more to help fill the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan's Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) -- the mission's minimum military requirement. Our goal should be to get commanders the forces, capabilities, training and equipment they need for an effective ANA-ISAF spring offensive and to demonstrate Alliance solidarity and effectiveness by the April 2-4 Bucharest NATO Summit. As we did before Riga, we should push all Allies to do more before or by Bucharest with special emphasis on underperformers. The assessment below (para 5) -- validated by SACEUR -- identifies the NATO Allies with military capabilities and available resources to fill critical ISAF shortfalls. We offer Washington and addressee posts the list at paragraph 5 for appropriate diplomatic follow-up to turn these realistic military requests into political deliverables by Bucharest.
END SUMMARY.

Allied Force Contributions--more rhetoric than action

12. (C) Despite progress in force generation following the November 2006 Riga Summit - over 7,000 soldiers added to the ISAF rolls (though half of those were American) - ISAF's CJSOR remains unfilled in such key areas as Regional Command South (RC-S) and Regional Command West (RC-W). Important capability gaps, such as strategic and operational reserve forces, maneuver battalions, rotary- and fixed-wing airlift (including medevac), counter-IED capabilities, and PRTs (especially Nimroz province, between Helmand province and Iran) remain. Major underperforming NATO Allies include France, Norway, Greece, Turkey, Belgium, Italy, Spain, and Germany.

OMLTs: Key to success and yet undermanned

13. (C/REL TO NATO) The increasing Allied rhetoric about Afghan leadership and "Afghanization" of the mission is beginning to ring hollow. In addition to the lagging force contributions, the continued failure by Allies to meet the need to replace U.S. embedded Afghan army training teams (ETTs) with NATO OMLTs, is hampering both the development of the Afghan army and police forces. Each U.S. ETT currently filling a NATO OMLT shortfall is an asset unable to be applied against existing Afghan police training needs. As the ANA grows to its authorized strength of 70,000 in 2008, NATO's OMLT requirement will increase from a requirement today for 49 OMLTs to 64 OMLTs by July 2008. If no new offers are received, NATO will have fielded less than half of its needed training teams. We need to push all Allies to

double their commitment to Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) training by the Bucharest Summit.

Equipment: Mission essential equipment / funding required

14. (C/REL TO NATO) Equipment or equipment transport trust fund donations to the ANA before the fighting resumes in the spring 2008 are also critical to building the capacity of the ANSF. To date, Allies have contributed more than 30,000 rifles, millions of rounds of ammunition, and howitzers, with more materiel in the pipeline. However, NATO's support has hit a wall; ten donations are waiting to be shipped to Afghanistan, but lack transport. The estimated cost for contracting lift for these donations is \$5,778,878 (4M Euros) while the ANA trust fund currently contains only \$462,292 (320K Euros). Allies must do more; our goal is either a financial or material donation of consequence from each Ally.

Standing needs for the ANA from all Allies include night vision goggles, optical sights, organizational clothing, and body armor. Additionally, the ANA suffers a crippling shortfall of light armored vehicles (need at least 100 M113 type vehicles), trucks (both fuel and medium tactical), heavy engineering equipment such as bulldozers, and both attack and transport helicopters. Nations should be encouraged to work through their National Military Representatives at SHAPE for specific ANA equipment needs in light of ongoing Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) efforts, and to identify the niches that they could fill.

GFGC Offers -- CJSOR Requests -- Operational Caveat Reduction

15. (C/REL TO NATO) The following assessment has been validated by SACEUR. Offers made by each country at the GFGC are listed first. Next, based on the current CJSOR and GFGC offers, we identify critical shortfalls we should seek to see filled immediately and not later than Bucharest. Lastly, it is noted which nations need to lift caveats based on SHAPE's recently released "Prioritized List of Operationally Restrictive Caveats."

BELGIUM: No GFGC offers. REQUEST -- confirmation of Kabul International Airport (KAIA) lead nation rotation (Apr-Oct 08); renew C-130 support; provide KAIA force protection capability; provide F-16 close air support (CAS); provide one (1) OMLT; provide a PRT and associated enablers in Dai Kundi Province by the second half of 2008.

BULGARIA: No GFGC offers. REQUEST -- Provide Role 2 Medical Treatment Facility (MTF); provide two (2) OMLTs. Lift operationally restrictive caveats. (Note: Bulgaria is one of six ISAF nations on SHAPE's prioritized list of operationally restrictive caveats that should be lifted quickly in order to give COMISAF maximum flexibility. Caveats list has been emailed to Embassy Sofia.)

CANADA: No GFGC offers. REQUEST -- Provide four (4) additional OMLTs.

CZECH REPUBLIC: GFGC Offer -- Base force protection for Uruzgan. REQUEST -- Provide Transport and Attack Rotary Wing (RW) Aviation for RC-S; provide an OMLT for 1 BDE/203 Corps.

DENMARK: No GFGC offers. REQUEST -- Provide F-16 CAS for RC-S; provide one (1) OMLT.

ESTONIA: No GFGC offers. REQUEST -- Provide one (1) OMLT.

FRANCE: No GFGC offers. REQUEST -- Provide Transport / Attack RW Aviation for RC-S; provide Special Operations Task Group (SOTG); provide a PRT by in the second half of 2008 for Nimroz Province; provide a Maneuver Battalion for Nimroz Province by the second half of 2008; provide two (2) additional (Kandak) battalion level OMLTs (offered one additional OMLT during Noordwijk) by the NATO Defense Ministerial in Vilnius in February 08.

GERMANY: GFGC Offer -- Fixed Wing airlift and 4 OMLTs for RC-N. REQUEST -- Provide the Operational Reserve Force (ORF) battalion for ISAF; provide a Special Operations Task Group (SOTG); provide three (3) additional OMLTs by the Bucharest Summit.

GREECE: GFGC Offer -- Corps level OMLT for RC-C and Kabul Intl Airport lead nation in April 08 or April 10. REQUEST -- Provide a Maneuver Battalion for RC-S or ISAF Operational Reserve Force (ORF) Battalion; provide Transport / Attack RW Aviation for RC-S; provide contributions to two (2) OMLTs (above what they have already pledged); consider establishing a PRT not later than April 2009. Lift operationally restrictive caveat. (Note: Greece is one of six ISAF nations on SHAPE's prioritized list of operationally restrictive caveats that should be lifted quickly in order to give COMISAF maximum flexibility. Caveat list has been emailed to Embassy Athens.)

HUNGARY: GFGC Offer -- OMLT offer with Slovakia contributions for Uruzgan. REQUEST -- Retain Pol-e Kohmeri PRT; provide one (1) OMLT and contributions to one (1) OMLT by the Bucharest Summit.

ICELAND: No GFGC offers. REQUEST -- Provide generous financial support for ANA trust fund to help move others' equipment donations to Afghanistan.

ITALY: GFGC Offer -- Strategic Reserve Force Battalion for 6 months. REQUEST -- Provide additional RW Attack Aviation for RC-W; provide two (2) additional OMLTs by the Bucharest Summit. Lift operationally restrictive caveats. (Note: Italy is one of six ISAF nations on SHAPE's prioritized list of operationally restrictive caveats that should be lifted quickly in order to give COMISAF maximum flexibility. Caveat list has been emailed to Embassy Rome)

LATVIA: No GFGC offers. REQUEST -- Increase contribution for Maimana PRT; provide one (1) additional OMLT (above what they have already pledged).

LITHUANIA: No GFGC offers. REQUEST -- Provide one (1) additional OMLT (above what they have already pledged).

LUXEMBOURG: No GFGC offers. REQUEST -- Provide one (1) OMLT or significant financial support for ANA Trust Fund.

THE NETHERLANDS: No GFGC offers. REQUEST -- Retain Task Force Uruzgan (including RW Transport / Attack Helicopters) and the PRT in Tarin Kowt in RC-S; provide two (2) additional OMLTs for 4 BDE/205 Corps by the NATO Foreign Ministerial.

NORWAY: GFGC Offer -- Reinforce Maimana PRT including Rotary Wing MEDEVAC, an OMLT contribution for RC-N or Kabul, and a Special Operations Task Group for 18 months operating in Kabul region. REQUEST -- Provide one (1) additional OMLT (above what they have already pledged); deploy the Telemark Battalion to RC-S by summer 2008.

POLAND: GFGC Offer -- 4x MI-17s and 4x MI-24s in support of Polish Battle Group and assume responsibility of PRT Paktika. REQUEST -- Provide one (1) additional OMLT (above what they have already pledged).

PORTUGAL: No GFGC offers. GFGC statement -- Announced troop drawdown from 165 commandos to 1 C-130 and one Garrison level OMLT (approximately 15 soldiers) for RC-C. REQUEST -- Provide Maneuver Battalion for Border Security in RC-S or Nimroz / Dai Kundi Provinces; provide support for additional two (2) OMLTs by the Bucharest Summit. Lift operationally restrictive caveat. (Note: Portugal is one of six ISAF nations on SHAPE's prioritized list of operationally restrictive caveats that should be lifted quickly in order to give COMISAF maximum flexibility. Caveats list has been emailed to Embassy Lisbon.)

ROMANIA: GFGC Offer -- Fixed Wing airlift and increasing Task Force Zabul up to 800 troops. REQUEST -- provide an OMLT for 2 BDE/205 Corps by the Bucharest Summit.

SLOVAKIA: GFGC Offer -- Base force protection for Uruzgan. REQUEST -- Provide a Maneuver Battalion or ISAF Operational Reserve Force (ORF); provide one (1) additional OMLT (above what they have already pledged).

SLOVENIA: No GFGC offers. REQUEST -- Provide a Maneuver Company for RC-W (for increase to a Maneuver Battalion in RC-W); provide one (1) additional OMLT (above what they have already pledged).

SPAIN: GFGC Offer -- confirmed Standing HQ contribution in 2011 (looking for earlier deployment if possible). REQUEST -- Provide Transport / Attack RW Aviation for RC-W; provide at least one (1) additional OMLT (in addition to the two (2) OMLTs already contributed). Lift operationally restrictive caveat. (Note: Spain is one of six ISAF nations on SHAPE's prioritized list of operationally restrictive caveats that should be lifted quickly in order to give COMISAF maximum flexibility. Caveats list has been emailed to Embassy Madrid.)

TURKEY: No GFGC offers. REQUEST -- Provide an additional

Maneuver Battalion or the ISAF Operational Reserve Force (ORF); provide Transport / Attack RW Aviation for RC-S; provide two (2) OMLTs. Lift operationally restrictive caveats. (Note: Turkey is one of six ISAF nations on SHAPE's prioritized list of operationally restrictive caveats that should be lifted quickly in order to give COMISAF maximum flexibility. Caveats list has been emailed to Embassy Ankara.)

UNITED KINGDOM: No GFGC offers. REQUEST -- Provide an additional Maneuver Battalion in RC-S by the second half of 2008, linked to Iraq reduction; provide one (1) additional OMLT (above what they have already pledged).

16. (C/REL TO NATO) USNATO has used the following general

points with Allies, which we encourage others to use in ongoing engagement with Allies on force generation, and ANA training and equipping.

Begin Points:

--At the Riga Summit (November 2006) our heads of state recommitted themselves to the ISAF Mission. At the Defense Ministerial in Noordwijk (October 2007) our ministers agreed to fill critical ISAF shortfalls, reduce caveats, and enhance contributions to ANA mentoring, training, and equipping.

--Allies have unsuccessfully addressed critical ISAF shortfalls for over a year. The absence of these forces and enablers will prolong the mission and increases the risks to our troops already deployed.

-- Overall the GFGC made limited progress in filling the ISAF CJSOR shortfalls. No offers were made against the 3 maneuver battalion shortfall in RC-South (Border Security Battalion, Nimroz, and Dai Kundi), the Rotary Wing Aviation Bridging Force in RC-South, and theatre ISR assets (full motion video).

--At the 159th Meeting of the Military Committee in Chiefs of Staff session, SACEUR requested that each Allied nation (except Iceland and perhaps Luxembourg) provide one more OMLT (above what they have already pledged). If provided, the shortfall in OMLTs would be almost resolved.

--ISAF is an Alliance commitment and every Ally must do more to fulfill the CJSOR. Our assessment--validated by SACEUR--is that most NATO countries have the capability and should be able to muster the political will to do more.

--We know that it is sometimes politically difficult to deploy resources in support of NATO missions, especially those far from home. But it is the responsibility of each government not only to marshal the resources but also the public support to fulfill its NATO commitments.

--NATO must fill these significant gaps in ISAF forces and trainers in order to ensure a strong Afghan and ISAF spring offensive next year and continued mission success in the run-up to Bucharest. Your added effort is essential to ensure Alliance solidarity - backed up by actions -- at the Bucharest Summit.

End points.
NULAND